This has been the predominant outcome.  When the output of decrypting
with a wrong key coincidentally resembled an OpenPGP packet header,
pgcrypto could instead report "Corrupt data", "Not text data" or
"Unsupported compression algorithm".  The distinct "Corrupt data"
message added no value.  The latter two error messages misled when the
decrypted payload also exhibited fundamental integrity problems.  Worse,
error message variance in other systems has enabled cryptologic attacks;
see RFC 4880 section "14. Security Considerations".  Whether these
pgcrypto behaviors are likewise exploitable is unknown.

In passing, document that pgcrypto does not resist side-channel attacks.
Back-patch to 9.0 (all supported versions).

Security: CVE-2015-3167

Most callers pass a stack buffer.  The ensuing stack smash can crash the
server, and we have not ruled out the viability of attacks that lead to
privilege escalation.  Back-patch to 9.0 (all supported versions).

Marko Tiikkaja

Security: CVE-2015-0243

This includes removing tabs after periods in C comments, which was
applied to back branches, so this change should not effect backpatching.

Specifically, on-stack memset() might be removed, so:

	* Replace memset() with px_memset()
	* Add px_memset to copy_crlf()
	* Add px_memset to pgp-s2k.c

Patch by Marko Kreen

Report by PVS-Studio

Backpatch through 8.4.

The function in question does not in fact ensure that the passed
argument is not changed, and the callers don't care much either.

provided by Andrew.

for 'bool'.  Per buildfarm warnings.

be more wary about having a value for BYTE_ORDER, clean up randomly-
chosen ways of including Postgres core headers.
Marko Kreen and Tom Lane