Revert error-throwing wrappers for the printf family of functions.

This reverts commit 16304a01, except
for its changes in src/port/snprintf.c; as well as commit
cac18a76 which is no longer needed.

Fujii Masao reported that the previous commit caused failures in psql on
OS X, since if one exits the pager program early while viewing a query
result, psql sees an EPIPE error from fprintf --- and the wrapper function
thought that was reason to panic.  (It's a bit surprising that the same
does not happen on Linux.)  Further discussion among the security list
concluded that the risk of other such failures was far too great, and
that the one-size-fits-all approach to error handling embodied in the
previous patch is unlikely to be workable.

This leaves us again exposed to the possibility of the type of failure
envisioned in CVE-2015-3166.  However, that failure mode is strictly
hypothetical at this point: there is no concrete reason to believe that
an attacker could trigger information disclosure through the supposed
mechanism.  In the first place, the attack surface is fairly limited,
since so much of what the backend does with format strings goes through
stringinfo.c or psprintf(), and those already had adequate defenses.
In the second place, even granting that an unprivileged attacker could
control the occurrence of ENOMEM with some precision, it's a stretch to
believe that he could induce it just where the target buffer contains some
valuable information.  So we concluded that the risk of non-hypothetical
problems induced by the patch greatly outweighs the security risks.
We will therefore revert, and instead undertake closer analysis to
identify specific calls that may need hardening, rather than attempt a
universal solution.

We have kept the portion of the previous patch that improved snprintf.c's
handling of errors when it calls the platform's sprintf().  That seems to
be an unalloyed improvement.

Security: CVE-2015-3166