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miscadmin.h

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    • Tom Lane's avatar
      eedb068c
      Make standard maintenance operations (including VACUUM, ANALYZE, REINDEX, · eedb068c
      Tom Lane authored
      and CLUSTER) execute as the table owner rather than the calling user, using
      the same privilege-switching mechanism already used for SECURITY DEFINER
      functions.  The purpose of this change is to ensure that user-defined
      functions used in index definitions cannot acquire the privileges of a
      superuser account that is performing routine maintenance.  While a function
      used in an index is supposed to be IMMUTABLE and thus not able to do anything
      very interesting, there are several easy ways around that restriction; and
      even if we could plug them all, there would remain a risk of reading sensitive
      information and broadcasting it through a covert channel such as CPU usage.
      
      To prevent bypassing this security measure, execution of SET SESSION
      AUTHORIZATION and SET ROLE is now forbidden within a SECURITY DEFINER context.
      
      Thanks to Itagaki Takahiro for reporting this vulnerability.
      
      Security: CVE-2007-6600
      eedb068c
      History
      Make standard maintenance operations (including VACUUM, ANALYZE, REINDEX,
      Tom Lane authored
      and CLUSTER) execute as the table owner rather than the calling user, using
      the same privilege-switching mechanism already used for SECURITY DEFINER
      functions.  The purpose of this change is to ensure that user-defined
      functions used in index definitions cannot acquire the privileges of a
      superuser account that is performing routine maintenance.  While a function
      used in an index is supposed to be IMMUTABLE and thus not able to do anything
      very interesting, there are several easy ways around that restriction; and
      even if we could plug them all, there would remain a risk of reading sensitive
      information and broadcasting it through a covert channel such as CPU usage.
      
      To prevent bypassing this security measure, execution of SET SESSION
      AUTHORIZATION and SET ROLE is now forbidden within a SECURITY DEFINER context.
      
      Thanks to Itagaki Takahiro for reporting this vulnerability.
      
      Security: CVE-2007-6600