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analyze.c

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    • Tom Lane's avatar
      62aba765
      Prevent indirect security attacks via changing session-local state within · 62aba765
      Tom Lane authored
      an allegedly immutable index function.  It was previously recognized that
      we had to prevent such a function from executing SET/RESET ROLE/SESSION
      AUTHORIZATION, or it could trivially obtain the privileges of the session
      user.  However, since there is in general no privilege checking for changes
      of session-local state, it is also possible for such a function to change
      settings in a way that might subvert later operations in the same session.
      Examples include changing search_path to cause an unexpected function to
      be called, or replacing an existing prepared statement with another one
      that will execute a function of the attacker's choosing.
      
      The present patch secures VACUUM, ANALYZE, and CREATE INDEX/REINDEX against
      these threats, which are the same places previously deemed to need protection
      against the SET ROLE issue.  GUC changes are still allowed, since there are
      many useful cases for that, but we prevent security problems by forcing a
      rollback of any GUC change after completing the operation.  Other cases are
      handled by throwing an error if any change is attempted; these include temp
      table creation, closing a cursor, and creating or deleting a prepared
      statement.  (In 7.4, the infrastructure to roll back GUC changes doesn't
      exist, so we settle for rejecting changes of "search_path" in these contexts.)
      
      Original report and patch by Gurjeet Singh, additional analysis by
      Tom Lane.
      
      Security: CVE-2009-4136
      62aba765
      History
      Prevent indirect security attacks via changing session-local state within
      Tom Lane authored
      an allegedly immutable index function.  It was previously recognized that
      we had to prevent such a function from executing SET/RESET ROLE/SESSION
      AUTHORIZATION, or it could trivially obtain the privileges of the session
      user.  However, since there is in general no privilege checking for changes
      of session-local state, it is also possible for such a function to change
      settings in a way that might subvert later operations in the same session.
      Examples include changing search_path to cause an unexpected function to
      be called, or replacing an existing prepared statement with another one
      that will execute a function of the attacker's choosing.
      
      The present patch secures VACUUM, ANALYZE, and CREATE INDEX/REINDEX against
      these threats, which are the same places previously deemed to need protection
      against the SET ROLE issue.  GUC changes are still allowed, since there are
      many useful cases for that, but we prevent security problems by forcing a
      rollback of any GUC change after completing the operation.  Other cases are
      handled by throwing an error if any change is attempted; these include temp
      table creation, closing a cursor, and creating or deleting a prepared
      statement.  (In 7.4, the infrastructure to roll back GUC changes doesn't
      exist, so we settle for rejecting changes of "search_path" in these contexts.)
      
      Original report and patch by Gurjeet Singh, additional analysis by
      Tom Lane.
      
      Security: CVE-2009-4136