From 22795f096b521e975800cd2fff222f958500ef19 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us>
Date: Thu, 23 Feb 2012 17:47:59 -0500
Subject: [PATCH] Last-minute release note updates.

Security: CVE-2012-0866, CVE-2012-0867, CVE-2012-0868
---
 doc/src/sgml/release-8.3.sgml | 30 ++++++++++++++++++
 doc/src/sgml/release-8.4.sgml | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 doc/src/sgml/release-9.0.sgml | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 doc/src/sgml/release-9.1.sgml | 57 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 4 files changed, 187 insertions(+)

diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/release-8.3.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/release-8.3.sgml
index e80743f463b..09f867b527d 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/release-8.3.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/release-8.3.sgml
@@ -34,6 +34,36 @@
 
    <itemizedlist>
 
+    <listitem>
+     <para>
+      Require execute permission on the trigger function for
+      <command>CREATE TRIGGER</> (Robert Haas)
+     </para>
+
+     <para>
+      This missing check could allow another user to execute a trigger
+      function with forged input data, by installing it on a table he owns.
+      This is only of significance for trigger functions marked
+      <literal>SECURITY DEFINER</>, since otherwise trigger functions run
+      as the table owner anyway.  (CVE-2012-0866)
+     </para>
+    </listitem>
+
+    <listitem>
+     <para>
+      Convert newlines to spaces in names written in <application>pg_dump</>
+      comments (Robert Haas)
+     </para>
+
+     <para>
+      <application>pg_dump</> was incautious about sanitizing object names
+      that are emitted within SQL comments in its output script.  A name
+      containing a newline would at least render the script syntactically
+      incorrect.  Maliciously crafted object names could present a SQL
+      injection risk when the script is reloaded.  (CVE-2012-0868)
+     </para>
+    </listitem>
+
     <listitem>
      <para>
       Fix btree index corruption from insertions concurrent with vacuuming
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/release-8.4.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/release-8.4.sgml
index 2cddc5ec0c4..7dbc78e500c 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/release-8.4.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/release-8.4.sgml
@@ -34,6 +34,56 @@
 
    <itemizedlist>
 
+    <listitem>
+     <para>
+      Require execute permission on the trigger function for
+      <command>CREATE TRIGGER</> (Robert Haas)
+     </para>
+
+     <para>
+      This missing check could allow another user to execute a trigger
+      function with forged input data, by installing it on a table he owns.
+      This is only of significance for trigger functions marked
+      <literal>SECURITY DEFINER</>, since otherwise trigger functions run
+      as the table owner anyway.  (CVE-2012-0866)
+     </para>
+    </listitem>
+
+    <listitem>
+     <para>
+      Remove arbitrary limitation on length of common name in SSL
+      certificates (Heikki Linnakangas)
+     </para>
+
+     <para>
+      Both <application>libpq</> and the server truncated the common name
+      extracted from an SSL certificate at 32 bytes.  Normally this would
+      cause nothing worse than an unexpected verification failure, but there
+      are some rather-implausible scenarios in which it might allow one
+      certificate holder to impersonate another.  The victim would have to
+      have a common name exactly 32 bytes long, and the attacker would have
+      to persuade a trusted CA to issue a certificate in which the common
+      name has that string as a prefix.  Impersonating a server would also
+      require some additional exploit to redirect client connections.
+      (CVE-2012-0867)
+     </para>
+    </listitem>
+
+    <listitem>
+     <para>
+      Convert newlines to spaces in names written in <application>pg_dump</>
+      comments (Robert Haas)
+     </para>
+
+     <para>
+      <application>pg_dump</> was incautious about sanitizing object names
+      that are emitted within SQL comments in its output script.  A name
+      containing a newline would at least render the script syntactically
+      incorrect.  Maliciously crafted object names could present a SQL
+      injection risk when the script is reloaded.  (CVE-2012-0868)
+     </para>
+    </listitem>
+
     <listitem>
      <para>
       Fix btree index corruption from insertions concurrent with vacuuming
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/release-9.0.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/release-9.0.sgml
index 7b29590bb11..16de221dc11 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/release-9.0.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/release-9.0.sgml
@@ -34,6 +34,56 @@
 
    <itemizedlist>
 
+    <listitem>
+     <para>
+      Require execute permission on the trigger function for
+      <command>CREATE TRIGGER</> (Robert Haas)
+     </para>
+
+     <para>
+      This missing check could allow another user to execute a trigger
+      function with forged input data, by installing it on a table he owns.
+      This is only of significance for trigger functions marked
+      <literal>SECURITY DEFINER</>, since otherwise trigger functions run
+      as the table owner anyway.  (CVE-2012-0866)
+     </para>
+    </listitem>
+
+    <listitem>
+     <para>
+      Remove arbitrary limitation on length of common name in SSL
+      certificates (Heikki Linnakangas)
+     </para>
+
+     <para>
+      Both <application>libpq</> and the server truncated the common name
+      extracted from an SSL certificate at 32 bytes.  Normally this would
+      cause nothing worse than an unexpected verification failure, but there
+      are some rather-implausible scenarios in which it might allow one
+      certificate holder to impersonate another.  The victim would have to
+      have a common name exactly 32 bytes long, and the attacker would have
+      to persuade a trusted CA to issue a certificate in which the common
+      name has that string as a prefix.  Impersonating a server would also
+      require some additional exploit to redirect client connections.
+      (CVE-2012-0867)
+     </para>
+    </listitem>
+
+    <listitem>
+     <para>
+      Convert newlines to spaces in names written in <application>pg_dump</>
+      comments (Robert Haas)
+     </para>
+
+     <para>
+      <application>pg_dump</> was incautious about sanitizing object names
+      that are emitted within SQL comments in its output script.  A name
+      containing a newline would at least render the script syntactically
+      incorrect.  Maliciously crafted object names could present a SQL
+      injection risk when the script is reloaded.  (CVE-2012-0868)
+     </para>
+    </listitem>
+
     <listitem>
      <para>
       Fix btree index corruption from insertions concurrent with vacuuming
diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/release-9.1.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/release-9.1.sgml
index 46abbec10a6..ca53f5fc7d2 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/release-9.1.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/release-9.1.sgml
@@ -34,6 +34,56 @@
 
    <itemizedlist>
 
+    <listitem>
+     <para>
+      Require execute permission on the trigger function for
+      <command>CREATE TRIGGER</> (Robert Haas)
+     </para>
+
+     <para>
+      This missing check could allow another user to execute a trigger
+      function with forged input data, by installing it on a table he owns.
+      This is only of significance for trigger functions marked
+      <literal>SECURITY DEFINER</>, since otherwise trigger functions run
+      as the table owner anyway.  (CVE-2012-0866)
+     </para>
+    </listitem>
+
+    <listitem>
+     <para>
+      Remove arbitrary limitation on length of common name in SSL
+      certificates (Heikki Linnakangas)
+     </para>
+
+     <para>
+      Both <application>libpq</> and the server truncated the common name
+      extracted from an SSL certificate at 32 bytes.  Normally this would
+      cause nothing worse than an unexpected verification failure, but there
+      are some rather-implausible scenarios in which it might allow one
+      certificate holder to impersonate another.  The victim would have to
+      have a common name exactly 32 bytes long, and the attacker would have
+      to persuade a trusted CA to issue a certificate in which the common
+      name has that string as a prefix.  Impersonating a server would also
+      require some additional exploit to redirect client connections.
+      (CVE-2012-0867)
+     </para>
+    </listitem>
+
+    <listitem>
+     <para>
+      Convert newlines to spaces in names written in <application>pg_dump</>
+      comments (Robert Haas)
+     </para>
+
+     <para>
+      <application>pg_dump</> was incautious about sanitizing object names
+      that are emitted within SQL comments in its output script.  A name
+      containing a newline would at least render the script syntactically
+      incorrect.  Maliciously crafted object names could present a SQL
+      injection risk when the script is reloaded.  (CVE-2012-0868)
+     </para>
+    </listitem>
+
     <listitem>
      <para>
       Fix btree index corruption from insertions concurrent with vacuuming
@@ -576,6 +626,13 @@
      </para>
     </listitem>
 
+    <listitem>
+     <para>
+      Allow MinGW builds to use standardly-named OpenSSL libraries
+      (Tomasz Ostrowski)
+     </para>
+    </listitem>
+
    </itemizedlist>
 
   </sect2>
-- 
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